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1 
EC cereals narket under now influences 
Shortage after surplus 
The conoon organization of the narket in cereals, which served as a nodcl 
' for the organization of the other agricultural markets, 
oalebr9:!i€d its tv1elfth birthday in August 1974. Granted, this was 
not a iT'":t-;y special occasion; nevertheless, starting fron the fact that 
it does !'ut oount as one of the problem children of the connon agricultural 
policy~ ics development up to now should be outlined here, in view of the 
mani.fo~.·J~ of-ten rapidly changing events which were decisive for this sector. 
In t1:e se~o:o.d part the market organization instruments used for each 
si tu.ation a.re discussed in detail. 
I • JJ§3L§l!:.-.E:-~nP"e of directi£E. 
The first part of this account can be very brief. Regulation No 19 on the 
progressive establishment of the con~on organization of the narket in cereals 
superseded the national market organizations in the Community of Six by 
introducing Concrunity arrangements for foreign trade and domestic markets. 
All national protective measures, and in particular the quantitative res-
trictions on inports, were abolished. Since there were still disparities 
in prices between the Member States, intra-comounity levies had to be 
applied, and even the uniform levy vis-~vis non-member countries was 
a thing of the future. It was not possible gradually to approximate the 
target prices of the individual Member States, as had originally been planned, 
so it was decided to go straight over to a connon cereals price with effect 
fror:1 1 July 1967, Admittedly, very difficult negotiations \-lere required 
to reach this decision, which was taken on 15 December 1964. 'lho Council 
of Ministers finally agreed to an average price level n.s proposed by the 
Commission. It based its decision on the fact that such a price level 
would reduce fam proceeds in those Member States whose prices had hitherto 
been higher- for this reason, equalization payments to Germany, Italy and 
Luxembourg were necessary - but would increase fam incones in those Member 
States where prices had hitherto been lower. The creation of an average 
2 price level was designed to avoid an expansion of production and the 
resulting fornation of surpluses which, according to the line of thought 
followed at the time in the light of the world maxket situation, could 
be cleared, if at all, only at great expense a,nd furthemore would have 
repercussions on cornoorcial policy if in due course the world market price 
were to be considerably lo~ver than the ComlUni ty price. It was considered 
important that the agricultural (price) policy of the ComrrruL~ty should 
leave import possibilities open for non-meraber countries. The Council of 
}llinisters took a far-reaching decision v!h.ich did not evoke any noteworthy 
public reaction at the tine but which after some years was to give rise to 
heated discussion, i.e. the fixing of the cereals prices in units of 
account (u.~.). This was intended to ensure that price decisions, once 
taken, ~~uld remain unaffected by any currency fluctuations in the 
individual J<:enber States. 
1. ~;ea!!s!o~ 2f_i!!t;:a::C£~i!_y_t_::a9;~ 
In the 1967/68 mnrketing year, intra-CoLrr.nxnity trade increased by some 
14% as compared tvith the previous year. The effect of the disappearance 
of intra-Conmunity frontiers was most noticeable in the trade in wheat, 
which showed e-n increase of 1135~• '!his figure r.ru.st be seen, however, in 
the light of the fact that in the 1966/67 marketing year imports of wheat 
fron Me8ber States had fallen by 33%, caused to a large extent by a drop 
in the French harvest of 3.5 million metric tons. The main consuwors of EEC 
whe~t in 1967/68 were Germany and the Netherlands, which together accounted 
for 74% of total inports. Gerr:1any imported 581 460 metric tons, which was 
nore than twice the amount i01ported in the previous yeC~.r 1 and the 
Netherlands imported 291 031 metric tons, which was more thnn five tines 
as much as in the previous year. Germany was also the main inporter of 
barley, with 809 943 metric tons, giving an increC~.se of 11% over 1966/67. 
The percentage increase in BelgiUr::l/Luxembourg was even higher (39%) t with 
total ir:1porta of 445 121 netric tons. On the other hand, maize inports 
dropped in all the Member States with the exception of the Benelux cotrntries. 
The biggest drop of all was in Ge~any1 by 83% (835 590 netric tons). This 
concerned nainly the naize fron the area south of the Loire, which was not 
cheap for German consuners. 
3 2. Increased intervention 
In 1967/68, intervention (State buying to maint~in intervention price 
levels) increased for all cereals except durum Wheat. The main reason 
for this was the exceptionally good harvest· in 1967, especinlly of Wheat 
in Gernany. The changes in the system of regional prices in south 
Germany, together with the lack of export possibilitiGs, probably 
contributed to the rise in quantities of interventi~n wheat in that area. 
Since intervention measures could no longer be taken at national level, 
intervention agencies started to buy in supplies (intervention A) in 
France in 1967/68, and the extent of s~ecinl intervention measures 
(intervention B) declined. Furthernore, in France the late decision 
to grant no carry-over payment for barley and the difficulties arising 
at the end of the marketing year affected the interventions A and B for 
this type of cereal. A comparison of production with domestic consumption 
revealod thnt 1 for 1967/68, taking imports into account, there was a 
surplus of more than 6 nillion metric tons of wheat, of which 4.8 million 
metric tons including flour l'ras exported. Most of the rest ha.d to be taken 
over by the intervention agencies. In the case of barley there was an 
overall surplus of approximately 3 nillion metric tons, of which some 
1.4 million metric tons were exported. Despite a considerable increase 
in domestic consunption, the trcnsitiona.l stocks, particularly tho 
intervention stocks, increased in comparison with the previous year. 
3. Ffi.goher exports 1 lo~r imoorts 
------------------
Total exports of cereals (not cotu1ting the processed products) in 1967/68 
increased by 24% in comparison ~th the previous y~ar. This increase was 
due mainly to the considerable rise in wheat exports (44%) and barley 
exports (55%). France contributed most to this development; it accounted 
for 89% of the exports, thereby naintaining its position as the leading 
exporting country in the Conmunity. Declines in exports fron Germany anc1 
the Benelux countries were caused by the discontinuance of concessions in 
the case of re-exportation of imported cereals vfuich had been allowed 
before the commonorganizntion of the tlarket cane into effect. The 
4 incree-se in exports fr:;n the Net~1erlanc_s was due to its being geographically 
favourabl~r si tuo.tod for exporting CoG~11.mi ty cereo.ls. Fnrthemore, the 
Cot:lr.luni ty once ag.:'tin exported large quanti ties of ~"heat in the foro of 
flour. 
Dcspi te the bigger hc-.rvest and the incre:1se in intra-Co[muni ty trnde, 
ir.~ports VJere alnost c:tt the sc-.D.e level as the previous year, if naize 
and sorgh,u:. are not taken into aocount. In 1967/68, o.s in the previous 
narketing yec:trs, ItaJ.y wo,s the loading cerec>,ls-inporting country in the 
CoDNuni ty, followed by Gerr:mny, vihich continued to ir::port the nost wheat. 
III. Surnlus fomation nnc:t cmmter neasures 
1 • ~o~o!c:tEY .. PEo£l~nE_ ~rt~t _f~.r~t _ s~Q~o~s-
~~e 1963/69 r.~arketing year was characterized by an especially difficult 
narket situation. The excellent harvest of 1968 yielded c.. supply for 
which there "cVO.S no corresponding rlen[Cnd, particulo.rly on the dooestic 
r.c..rket. More0ver, D.r:metary problcns continued to 1-vorsen in the last feN 
D.0:1ths of tho n-:1rkcting year. The high forward discounts for the 
French franc resulted in French cerec..ls being available on the narket 
in quantities which no longer corresponded to the actual D.arket require-
Dents; this w<ls pQrticularly so in the northern countries of the 
CoriDUni ty. Since these cereals were on offer at prices below the inter-
vention price, doD.estic production ho.d to be taken over by the intervention 
c..gencies. It becane nor~ and nore the practice to obtain cereals for 1he 
sole purpose of selling then under advMto_geous conditions to the Gerr.mn, 
Dutch ~1d 3elgic:tn intervention agencies. This developoent caused the 
CoD.nission in rn:ay 1969 to limH intervention in Gemany 1 Belgiun and the 
Netherlands on cereals harvested in these 1,~e;-:Jber States. In this way it 
was possible to prevent speculative novenent of coD.Dodities. 
2. Intervention steaks at record levels 
The considera'Jle increase in intervention in the 1968/69 n.<1.rketing year 
was also influenced b;y the fact th:;.t the derived intervention prices in 
soD.e Gernan production regions hindered the outflovi of cereals to the 
consumer regions in the Rhine and the Ruhr. This opened up additional 
5 sales possibilities for goods from those regions in the north of France 
which were favourably situated as regards transport • In 1968/69 a 
total of approximately 5 nillion netric tons of cereals ha.Cl to be t~>:en 
over by the intervention agencies; that was 18o% or 3.15 million metric 
tons more than in the previous marketing year. There ~-s no corresponding 
outflmr of intervention ccroalf.l, r:::o thc.t on 31 July 1969 the f'tock" 
in hand at the intervention agencies had reached a record level of 6.1 
million metric tons~ The si.tuation for oonnon wheat was particularly· 
critical: it accounted- for 4.4 of those 6.1 million oetric tons. 
3· ~£e~s!v~ Eh~s!n~~o~_of !U!P!u~e~ 
The beginning of the 1969/70 marketing year must be seen in the light of 
the unfavourable developcent of the previous year. Transitional stooks 
which were far in excess of the normal stocks exerted pressure on the 
market and caused serious storage probleos in Germany and in certain 
parts of Italy. This situation was made even no re difficult in Germany 
because of the persistent ~ours regarding the inpending revaluction of 
the D-Mark. Since holders of stooks of cereals considered intervention 
as the only possible~ of avoiding finanoial'losses, it seemed likely 
that there would be an increase in intervention stocks resulting in a 
serious shortage of storage space available to the German intervention 
agencies. And, since constant intervention is a principle of the connon 
organization of the oarket in cereals, effective but expensive measures 
had to be taken in order to prevent serious difficulties from arising. 
These included promoting the denaturing of common wheat by raising the 
denaturing premium, thereby rechannelling it into the fodder sector; 
different storage arrangeoents for intervention cereals; special 
intervention oeasures for GermD~ which made it possible to sell the 
quantities delivered from Fr~oe under the terms of the old contracts with-
out creating difficulties for domestic production •vhile at the same tine 
stimulating the marketing of Germany cereals from December 1969; 
encouragement of exports to third countries. Finally,the devaluation of the 
French franc removed the uncertainty that hnd hitherto existed. The 
consequent increase in French market organization prices was not completed, 
howeve~, until the beginning of the 1971/72 marketing year; in the me~1time, 
ooopenaatory payments in respect of foreign trade were either paid or 
6 imposed. Correspondingly, in line with the revaluation of the D-Ivlark in 
1969, the ::1arl::et organization prices expressed in D-Mark~ -vrere lowered on 
1 January 1970, this r.1easu.re being accm:1panicd by the granting of compen-
satory pa;yuents to German agriculture. At the end of the 1969/70 narketing 
year, intervention stooks were considerably lower: 775 000 metric tons of 
comnon wheat and 209 000 metric tons of barley. Rye still presented prob-
lens, howeveri the German intervention n.gencies' stocks rose to 810 000 
netric tons by 31 July 1970. 
The 1970/71 marketing yecr began with nornal cereals stocks after the stocks 
of the previous year had been substanti::11ly reduced as a result of export 
and denduring of co:mr.~on whea.t. The snm.ller harvest and the lower carry-over 
stocks decreased the cereals stocks for the 1970/71 marketing year by 
approximately 6-7 n1illion netric tons compared >·ri th the stocks of 1969/70. 
This had a staoilizing effect on market development. At the same tine, 'Vrith 
sales no re buoyant r.nd operators carrying rather higher stocks, the inte:I'-
vontion ~~ru1titiee bought in contracted sharply. 
The consunption of cereals in the Co::1muni t~r rose to come 77.8 nillion metric 
tons in 1970/71. The reason for this >;as the increase in the consumption of 
cereals as fodder, caused by the increase in production of pigs for slaughter 
as vrell [~S of eggs c.nd poul tryrnea1;. The market continued to show a preference 
for naize as a fodder cereal, as is evidenced by a consumption of 16.5 
nillion raetric tons. Approximately 8 million metric tons of wheat was used 
for feed, about half of '·:hich was in denatured foro. But only from tirJe to 
time 11ere we able to forget the surplus proble:n. The cereals harvest of 
1971 brought it to mind again. 'llJ:J.ere ;.ras a record harvest of sone 17 r:rlllion 
netric tons, 11hich oxceede::l the previous record harvest of 1969 by around 
·' ~"· The greatest quantitative increase was in the production of common 
eme<:ct. In the 1971/72 rw.rketing year, b3rley benefited from a considerable 
cleD:'.nd from certain non-r:1enber countries, nnd this had an tmexpected stabi-
lizing effect on the barley market. :3esides nai?;e the surplus common wheat 
also benefited from this development, so that denaturing reached more or 
less the sane level as in the previowJ yearo The high harvest ::1gain 
resulted in l0.rge intervention purchases. In the case of barley, there was 
an exceptiorcc;.lly great qunnti ty of winter barley, for 1-vhich the required 
ninimun qu::1li ty ctill constituted an excessively high intervention induce-
ucnt. Furthcroore, in the cr,se of this cereal, too, the intervention possi-
1}ility fror1 the first month of the Qarketil:.g year resulted in a lack of 
~ctivc effort to keep stocks and mru<e cor~ercial sales. 
7 Almost 100% cf the intervention \'rinter barley had to be taken over in 
the first t1'l'O months of the rnn.rketine year. Tl1e previously noted hi~;l1 
degree of intervention for rye conti:'lUed. The main reasons for the 
persisti:1g difficultiea in tl1e case of rye were the 1u1favourable price 
ratio to fodder grain, which still exists, and the fixing of different 
intervention prices in different regions, a practice which is in conflict 
with the market rules and has F'ince ceased. 
IV. R~versal to shorta~ 
The 1972/73 marketing year saw the beginning of a development of uhicl1 
very little account had been taken when the detail~ of the orgru1ization 
of the market in cereals vtere uorked out. It started ui th the purchase 
by the USSR of vast quantities of whea-t and fodder cereals. \'lithin 
about six months this country bought nearly 30 rd llion metric tonG fron the 
USA a•1d Cancda, Austrc,lia, Sueden, the Community .o.nd even Rumania. 
Purchases froo the USA, amounted to 18 million r.1etric tonr::, which C()rrcsponds 
to 40/S of cereal exports fro~r~ that country in a normal year. This import 
demand from tl1e Soviet Union t-ta::J accompanied by- an equ;.lly high demand 
from other import countries, a bad harvest in ~ustralia, and the lack 
of anchovy shoals in Peruvian wn.ters. The attempt to make up for the 
shortfall of Peruvian fislm1eal production by soyabean protein increased 
the price of soya. beans and lli th it the price of t-Theat and fodder. The 
effects of this were particularly noticeable in tho;.:e Eember States which 
depend to a large extent on imports and to ~lhich the accession compensatory 
amom1t in accordance with the rules of the Accersion Treaty cannot be 
applibd \:here the world market price excoedc that of the Corunm1ity. This 
resulted in nv1rket prices which tvere considerably higher thr.:.n the 
intervention price, especially in the United Kin~om and Ireland. 
Although in 1972 the wheat ho.rvest of 41.1 million r::etric tons in the 
nine countries which now constitute the Comr.nmi ty exceeded the 40.1 
million metric tone of the previous year, and a.l though 1973 shotied no 
chance as compared with 1972, the beginning of the 197 3/7 4 marketing 
year brought regional supply difficulties for Italy. As a result 
8 unprecedented quanti ties of French when.t \V"ere sent to Italy, Hhere the 
wheat harvest had fallen below :n.ormal. Froncr ... wheat deliveries in 
August 1973 were 167 700 metric tons as against only 21 000 metric tons 
in the corresponding month of the previou~ year. Furthermore 200 000 
metric tonn of wheat from the stocks of Ger~, French and Belgin.n 
intervention agencies were rnnde available for the purpose of supplying 
the Italian population \lith foodstuffs. The Italian intervention 
agencies sold 107 000 metric tons of common wheat from their ovm stocks 
in order to cover the most urgent needs of southern Itely. Finally, 
a ban wns placed on exports of durum wheat from the Community - which 
incidentally is still in force - and also on exports of flour, gToats 
and meal !llL'..de from Italian wheo.t. Duri:1g thir; period t~'e insufficient 
graduation of intervention prices within the Community n~ifected itself 
disadvantae:;eoc:sly in that it wo.s not poe:lible to channel the cereals 
auto runt ically to the are an where they t1erc needed. 
3. £o:EID~.! t~ !;e:;:e_::t~e_!e~s _ c,::n~c.!o~s _of ;.:c~p;~_n.::i~i_!j._!y _ t~-vr~r9;s_ n,::n:m_::m~o:.: 
countries 
The Community i~3 also aware of its res:;_:>ondbility toward8 its traditional 
customer cc.;u1·1tries and particularly of itr: ·:)bligations to tLe cleveloping 
countries. Co!Il11'urii ty food aid in the form of cerertls nov.r coues to a.n 
annual total of 1.287 million metric tons, whereas the Comr:nmity of Six 
used to provide 1.035 million metric tons. I'iaintenance of the first 
figure at th.'J.t level requirec a 251{ incrense in expenditure. In order 
to make a lar[,'er qua.'ltity of common v1he2.t avC1ilable for export and 
thereby supplement the supply on the worlcl market, the Con~ission decided 
to drasticnlly reduce the inducement to convert common wl1eat into fodder 
by grantin~ denatm'ing premiums with effect from 1 November 1973i since 
10 February 19711- no premiums of this kind have been gr2.nted. Theoretically 
cpeakinc;, however, a premium can still be granted if the necesrary conditions 
are present, which in the short term is m1likely to be the case. The 
fact of the mc.tter is that 1 except for a brief period, t~~e l'lorld m'U'ket 
price hes been clec.rly above the Cor:unt.mity price ever since tllG nutur.m. 
of 1973, a situation in direct contrast with that prevrciling Hhen the 
common orgr-nization of the 1:1arket in cereal::; oe.me into effect. In line 
with this development, the attit'.l.de of the USA ho.s dso chMced. The 
r.ccusation that t:1e Corrm1U11ity was pursuing <'..h o.gcros:::;ive export policy 
which interfered with sales by traditional cereals-exportine countries, 
vdth the object of providing o.rtificial protection for uncompetitive 
Community agriculture, has receded into the background. At the time 
9 tb~ C·,:mmunity wD-s a,blc to defend itself by pointine to the increo.se in 
US exports, eupecially ooy<:L, to Europe o.nd also by pointing out that a 
compaJ.•ison of support payments in USA aericulture with those in Comraunity 
agriculture showed o.n advantage for the USA. 1!.t present the Comruunity is 
urgently needed as a source of supply on the world mc.rket in order to 
enable a policy of equalizE'..tion in internn.tional conte:ct to be applied. 
Investigation of the Community export trade in cereals shows a clear upward. 
trend. Ad.mittedl;y; at the time this report was written n. complete survey 
was av~ilable only for the 1972/73 marketing year, in which year the 
shortaee on the world market had not yet manifested itself so clearly. 
In the case of wheat exports from the Community we are mainly concerned 
with common wheat, whereas the imports consist to a large extent of durum 
wheat for the manufacture of groats, r:!eal ond pr-,ste procluct s as we 11 o..s 
quality wheat, i.e. types with a high baking value for n1ixing with Comr.11.mit3r 
'!-:heat. It mu et be stated however thc.t in recent years the cultivation of 
wheat vtith high baking qur::.lities has been £Teatly increased in the Comnmnit;;,r, 
particularly in France. This is reflected in the decline in Community 
import~, which is dealt with in r;reater detail below. Besides conm1on 
wheat, barley pbys an iraportant part in export::;. According to the 
Statistical Office of the Europeru1 Communities, the wheat exports including 
by-products of the original Community of Six vrere 14.17 million metric tons 
in 1972/73 c.s comp2.red with 10.28 Dillion metric tcms in 1971/72, the crec-.ter 
part of which {8.81 million metric tons and 6.30 million metric tons, 
respectively) came from France. Thio, therefore, constituted en increase 
of 37 .8%. A coraparison between the average for "1971/72 11 determined over 
a number of years and the nverac-e for "1967 / 68" shows a yearly incre<:'AJC r f 
6.1% in the rate of growth. If the United Kin3lor1, Denmark and Ireland 
are cottnted as r1cmber States for this period - the Community rn:::,rkct 
ol"ganization cc.me into effect in these countrierJ on 1 li'ebruary 1973 
exporto decline to 12.04 million metric tons. In addition to this, the 
United Kint_;dom exported 167 000 metric tom;. In the year under revieH 
the Community of Six exported 7.60 oillion metric tons of 1vheat and 4. 34 
million metric tons of barley, as oppo::<ed to .q .• 82 million metric tom; of 
wheat and 4.27 million metric tons of barley in 1971/72; thio constitutes 
an increare of 57 .9}~ for v;heat and 1.6% for barley. A compl.ri"on between 
11 1971/72" and "1967/68" nhows n.n increase of 1.5~~ for ivheat and 21.31~ for 
barley on the basis of the Coumtmity of Nine. On the sn.we basis, export'-! 
to non-member cottntries declined by 7.52 million metric tuns for t·rheat o.ncl 
by 4.08 million metric tons for barley. In ac~di tion, the United Kinc_;d.or.1 
exported 62 000 metric tons of common wheat and 88 000 metric ton;: of bnrle;y. 
10 From July 1973 up to and including June 1974, the Community of Nine exported a 
total of 5.33 million metric tons of wheat including flour expressed aF cereal 
value, the delivEJries t0 Britain being in addition to the intra-Community trade. 
(b) Droll in i~!t: 
The Coocrunity of Six imported a total of 16.73 million metric tonP of cereals in 
1972/73 as against 14.35 million metric tons in the previous year, giving an 
increase of 16.6%; but the percentage was -3~J. in 1971/72 aP against 1970/71 and 
-1.7'fc· in "1971/72" as agdnf't "1967/68". Calculated in term£ of the Cc-mmunity 
of Uine - counting imports from the United Kingdon and Denm1;1.rk into the Community 
of Six a8 Col:lmU...'Ylity deliveries - the import total goes do1tm to 16.39 million 
octric tono. In e~dition to this, the United Kingdom imported ~.9 million 
l!letric tons of cereals in 1972/73, giving a total of over 22 million metric tons. 
Mttize accounted for the major part ( + 23%) of the imports by the Cor.nnunity of Six 
in 1972/73, 1'rrith 9.86 million metric tons as opposed to 8. 02 million metric tons 
in 1971/72. A cooparison between 1971/72 and 1970/71 sh~nf' a decline, however, 
of 18.4% and betueen "1971/72" and "1967 /68'' a decline of 3. 31o. The high maize 
inports can be attributed to the increased output of animal products (pigmeat, 
oggs and poultry). Furtherr.ore, where the world narket :price '1-J'as below Col'llr:lunity 
level, nnize '\..ras the u1ost favourably priced fodder cereal, particularly at the 
e:>..-pense of barley. In addition to the maize import!" by the Co!lli"11Dity of Six in 
1972/73, there were United Kingdom iMports to the amount of 2.7 ·million metric 
tons. Italy was the leading importer of maize fron non-nonber countries, with 
4. 7 million metric ton£. The total wheat quantities of 3.53 million metric tons 
constituted an important item of the cereals import balance fo::r.the Community of 
Six in 1972/73. There was an increase of 1~ compe,red with 1971/72; et, decrea8e, 
however, of 31i for 1971/72 compared with 1970/71, and a decrease of 1.A~ for 
"1971/72" c0mpe.red. with "1967 /68". Furthermore, in 1972/73 the United Kingdom 
imported 2.8 nillion metric tons of whe~t, thus heading the list, followed by 
Gcrnany Fith 1. 0 rr.illion metric tons, Ite,ly with o. 97 r.1illion metric tons, and 
the Netherlands with 0.38 million metric tons. It must alPo be mentioned that, 
in the year under review, the Conmunity of Six import~d 2.3 million metric tons 
of barley a~ opposed to 2.4 million netric tons the year before, a decreare of 
3.3fo. In term; of the Conrrunity of Nine the quantity decline& to 2.05 r.1illion ' 
metric tons. The United Kingdon, one of the important barley-producing countries, 
imported only 389 000 nctric tonP from non-member countries, whereas Italy with 
1.15 nillion metric tons tops the list, followed by Germany with 1.06 million 
metric tons. In the period fron July 1973 -to 'June 1974 the Community of Nine 
iL1ported C', totn.l of Eome 5 nillion netric tom'' of whee,t including f10ur expres8ed 
as cereal value. 
11 4. Rise in intra-Community trade frontier compensation problematic 
Intra-Community cereals trade continued to show an upward trend, corresponding 
to the given Cox:ummity preference, up to and including tile 1973/74 1;1arketing 
year; official figures are available, however, only for the 1972/73 
marketing year. Business circles complain of the uncertainty which, 
because of frontier compensation, exists in the case of downwards-floating 
currencies and makes dealings in futures extremely risky. Consequently, 
repeated demands were made for advance fixing of frontier compensatory 
amounts. Matters were not helped by the fact that ~~ance, one of the most 
important cereals producers in the Community, decided to float the franc 
in isolation. Olring to events in the monetary field, the common 
agricultural market has now split into seven different sections viz. the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, the Benelux countries, France, Italy, Germo..ny ~d 
Denmark, the last-named country being the only one which does not make use 
of frontier compensation. Although frontier compensation is the only 
means of implementing market organization in the light of the varying 
currencies it is difficult to maintain, despite the simplification undertaken 
on 4 June whereby each country applies the frontier compensation which 
corresponds to its currency deviation and the joint floaters' amounts do 
not change during the entire marketing year. Since economic conditions 
differ greatly among the indi·r.idual Member States - take the rate of 
inflation alone as an example - it is hard to calculate coopensatory amounts 
which are correct in every respect. ~1e Commission advocates that, in the 
interest of the common agricultural market, the frontier compensatory ~aunts 
shall be abolished by 31 December 1977• 
In 1972/73 the Community of Six transacted intr~Community trade in cereals, 
including by-products, to the amount of 11 million metric tons, which equalled 
the level of the previous year. In 1970/71, an increase in the growth rate 
of 35.1% was recorded with reference to the previous year; 111971/72" compared 
with "1967 /68" showed an increase of 18. 3%. France was the leading supplier 
of cereals in the Community with a total of 8.26 nrlllion metric tons, i.e., 
75% of total supplies. France showed an increase of 52.4% in 1971/72 over 
1970/71. The most important Community consumers of French cereals are 
Belgium-Luxembourg, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom which 
imported close on 3 million metric tons in 1972/73• 
12 Italian cereal imports from the Commtmi ty1 on the other -hand, remained at a 
very low level. This must be seen in the light of the special arrangement 
allowed :for. !tal~,. in rc:.'lpect of i!:lpC"l'ts f!'on non ... ncnber countriesi thir 
arrangement is gr~dually coming to an end. The most important items in 
intra-Community cereals t:rade are wheat ( 1972/73: 4. 7 nillion metric tons), 
maize (3.9 million raEdric tons) and barley (2 mill:l.on metric tons). 
5. .19;7:~/74 still considerable intervention - less wheat converted_ for use 
~~~~~~~~-~~---~~~-~~~~~------~--~~~~ 
as fodder 
_,_, ............ 
Intervention in respect of common wheat in the six original Member States 
still concerned the substantial amount of 1•21 million metric tons in the 
1973/74 marketing year. Germany accounted for approximately 75% 
(760 000 metric tons) of this, but Belgium's share was also noteworthy, 
l-rith '237 000 metric tons. These figures may be due to the absence of carry-
over payments for stocks in hand at the end of the ma1·keting yea!'. For 
the first tine since the common organization o'f the market came into 
existence, the Commission did not deem such payment necessary, because of·the 
high world market prices. The Council agreed with this attitude. 
Monetary events'may also have had an effect. Sihce, within the framework 
of frontier compensation, the effect of thedevaluation of the French franc 
was not tJ.keh.into account in the case of French cereal deliveries to 
fellow Member States, French oereuls were underpriced on the German· and 
Beneltut markets. The undev-pricing of the Frellch cereals waa·partly responsible 
for c~reals on the German and BeneluX markets being bought in by intervention 
agencies or for French cereals themselves being bought in. Although wheat 
in~rvention increc;,sed by 193.5% in comparison w±th 1972/73, there was a 
decrease of 9-~fo in comparison with "1968/69" (1968 =average 1967, 1968 and 
1969; 1969 = average 19681 1969 and 1970). In Germany the int~rvention agencies 
bought in 139 000 met'ric tons of rye, which was 58.3% less than in the previous 
year, and 342 000 metri<; tons of barley, likewise practically only in Germany, 
which was 30~5% more than in the previous year. According to the cereals market 
organizat'i"n' the g'Ut~.rantee ·given to the producer in the. form of intervention 
possibilitl~s is only an emergency measure. However, in the present situation 
of short supplies the interVention stocks have often proved very useful in enabli.ng 
food aid obligations to be met. 
In 1973/74 in the Comgunity of Nine, only 4.43 million metric tons of wheat were 
consa~ed by animals as against 7.78 million metric tons in the previous year. 
As has already been mentioned, on 10 Feb'rUary 1974 the Commission ceased to 
encourage the conversion of cerealn for fodder in view of the crisis situation 
in soce C.::velo~1il1g COlmtrics. 
13 
The d;cvalvp!.nerrt of nlf'.J."kf};'t .prices for nonm:rH..rholit,. ;;i;11 iha inrt.hiiduaJ ~,~lriirPG:t:· 
StateJt" d"if:fe:r·_ed '-{7'tHJ;t,1y rl.uri~ -~lle "1972·/7/.i L-.arkei!jin.g .;,teal'" In Tta.l,jr an.d. 
the Ufni.:ted I<:ing'd.om :~kc·:t ;.Pl"it::fH3 ·w:ette f:'e.r above 1:he \-:threah:old J.l!'liCt> j :il.i 
Francte,, ;~G<>.l?Tr'~· .antl ~bhe ,;GeneJ.u:c ooun.tr:ies tlltty welffl r:norliil;;r beJ.otv ti.t.. The 
priCe! ~:j;:f.f'BDQV:t'i-a.ilS ·:fd;~ei'l :in :the .'ind'i."~filiuaJ. ruorrthc :df ·'the otarketiiU.{; ye~:t"' 
fluctl.:lla:fioo. stx·o~,3··;f ootl a:t thf; :beg.i:ntit:ng :rif ;1v.74 Wt.'Te .n't nw.C±1num va..'"'i.anoe 
to th'(! .~·:•n:t ,pf 30 .'\:l,.oa... ·per .metmo ton 11e'tua.en "'Jhe itmi;'tad Y .. dttrP:,itrnn ·oti '!;he 
one hl®~l ;and G~mcll~l..'-'" .atld .. !k.l:g!.i::um . .cm <'ilhe ·otilh•~;, ·atJil \t'o th.e ·a-'!;ont of 55 u-..a.~ 
per n~i.r:l-Q ·to,n ·osv't~.e:n !I:taly ·Oll the ·.one har..d .ana "~ ·aw !te'lgiiwn .Ott ~,h..,. 
othe!~... :;m:t .. ;.'luoh :a CoJl!P~.i:$O:tl (iJf Jl!>:Loas :im :uriitb-s cif acrotJUn't be~t~reMl M;Hnber 
StatE'.s -~:t;h. u :.;emc O'Ul'!'~?;nt;';y -~ iNero'tf>zo Si;a:tes 'l.ri 1lh a strong CUl"l•oney only 
presEmts (;), dJ.st.or~tli~>!l p:i.:.Ytru.;re :tlf .Y'.c~ali~y~, e::i.1tc-s· iD. a.ooo7.'itr.1'lt:e ;,Ji'tih 1\rti: :~)1J..f:, t ('l) 
of Re~.~ . .la:tS.on J!~T~C ~1r: ~'74/7~ of thE' Oom1c:i1 the .cr.:::rrency OC>J'41>el'l~>tttocy ~'-lnCl\:t.:c:t 
was l;l(Jt a-pplied ln lt::~~;;r,, Jf\r;;;:nce• tbe ttr.d.te.ft ICi:ngdom :ana. :.r·~ ... c~an.l., Fr•:t· a 
oonsji.der~bJoe pa.d of th.e "'!)}7:·~/74 1l".Zl.l.''k..;:•i:ir..g ye;U"' l1.C"J i..mporl 1~1.:-:-J.f...~ He.re 
cha.rl~d. fo:r: c~mmm; iih·:~ill:t 'fr·)~' :-.wl· .. m..:-:nJ'?)FT' coo::-t.ri~;:~. CoxJ.:sequ:cn-!;ly, ?!'~.oes :u~ 
Membd;r i3"i:tJ.:l;€s ~-0PfJT13.crJ.t on impo!'t:~;~ srw·~:n c•t: tl~\:' 'U:J.i:·b!'!tl Kingt'iom ~?.:nii !t::,J.y,~ 
l'iere i:nt1ue:nced '!Jy 1.1?.(:; Bit:J.a-tion l)l"(Wt1.~li:r,z;- on t't:: tz-.,:rldl. Tili:i.i7ket, i<7he;:·e 
prictli~ 'lf0l'i2 :;,J:JC·Vf; t,iw th:r~?-sh')}'! pr-:i.or:,.. M:<r'l:her-m:::;~·~, t.h~ !!'J>.:il:il-t3JYp1:1.,)~ti.en n:t 
curr(~l')liy nm:.apo.,~:•..-;a.-tor";t nr.K,i.l.t.~t;: in these cout.rt:ri1JS (i:mpo:ri, su'hsid,.v) ct .... ··~uf'>,l ""' 
furtl~e:r pri.ce r:i..::G.., Prices ill G•?!'ma1JY1 ~m th;;; o·ther hand.t w~r~; belti(..Y the 
thre:shoH price., This •:::I'IJ.l t<: attl'ib-Jrted to the oore favourable mlPPl.Y 
situ;il.tion f."or common wheat iu that country and also to the deliveries of 
Fren,:sh CO!TllllOr.t Nlt~ni;, which 11e:ro especially cheap because ~.c hanch O'tll'teu•:~y 
co~!~~~tory ~t (e>~ort leyy) was not applied. In France price~ w~re at 
a reb.t:l,.vely high level, but were nevertheless belm-r the threshold l):r.iCe fox• 
the g"!.'l<:a·tQr pCIJ"t of the marketing year, despi·~e an increase in deliverlfY:'>t 
partluul~l:·l;y to l'tdy ( + 395%) and to German;r ( + 21%). In the ~1aS~;:) of 
Germ;\:ny, theae deliveries were facilitated by tho fact that the ourl"r.mcy 
compe~llilato.r:r amo\.Ult was not applied, whereas in the case of Italy, whero 
no cu:rr·€•fl.(l;y' compensatory amount mta applied. ei the:r (import subsidy), the 
effer;rte of tht:' mont'ta.l".)" si tua.tion were t1ot so :fSJ."-reachlng. 
14 Italy bought large quanti ties from France in order to avoid having to pay 
the very high world market price. It must be mentioned, however, that the 
Darket prices of cereals in Italy, in contrast to the situatibn in the other 
Member States, were alw~s closer to the target price than to the 
intervention price. Since this is the case not only with fodder grain 
(dependent to a large extent on imports) but also with ~heat, the form of 
marketing could also pl~ a role here. 
V. Balancp altered througq enlarGement 
1. £n! t~d-Ki~.2m:._l.!;.a,!!iQg_i_sp,2r,! £O~,!rz 
'The entry of tho United Kingdom meant that a major importer of cereals was 
added to the Community in 1973. This had an effect on the Community's state 
of supply in relation to demand. The net import requirements of the 
Co~~ity of Six, which had dropped to below 10 million metric tons, could, 
under normal conditions, reach approximately 12 million metric tons for the 
Conwmnity of Nine: maize, quality wheat for mixing purposes, and du.rum 
wheat for the manufacture of paste products. The British import requirement 
of wheat was in the neighbourhood of 3.3 million metric tons, of which 
approximately 1 million metric tons in this marketing year was covered by 
France and the rest by non-member countries. In addition to this there was 
an import requirement of some 3 nillion metric tons of n~ize, one-sixth of 
which was supplied by Franco • 
.?• Tendency, however, to raise Oi"in productio~ 
~-~-~-----~~~~~-~----~ 
There seems to be every reason to believe that the United Kingdom, whose 
agricultural structure is goodt will become less depe~ent-on imports in 
the future. At present, cereals constitute on~ about 30% of British 
agricultural production. Since the prices in this field have developed 
favourably in the past tt.,.o years, many farmers succeeded in making up for 
the lower prices for animal products; it must not be forgotten, however, 
that production costs for cereals have increased very sharply. Producers 
now show a tendency to use more green and dry fodder and to sell as much 
cereals as possible. Before the adoption of the Community market 
organizations in the United Kingdom some 50% of the wheat harvest was 
converted to fodder because the difference in price beTween wheat and 
barley wan only slight. 
15 The area'under wheat, which in 1974 was approximately 1.25 million 
hectares, has grown by more than 120 000 hectares since 1972. Most 
striking, however, is the increase in yield per hectare. In 1972 it uaa 
42.4 quintals; but in 1974 it is estimated at 48 quintals, with peaks of 
over 100 quintals. hbre productive wheat types are respon3ible for this. 
The development seems to be continuing, as is also the case in the other 
Member States. It is also possible that, if cereal prices continue to 
be profitable, not only will the trend towards reduction of forage crop 
growing continue but there will also be a reduction in permanent 
grasslx1d corresponding to the Dutch exaqpl~ with its relatively high 
percm:H:1ge of far more than 5o% of cereals in mixed fodder. A similar 
price G.'ttuation will probably see a reversion to less expensive substitutes 
such as soya, tapioca, waste products of the starch industry, carob, peas, 
etc., >Jhich would be important for cereal consumption in the United 
Kingcl.oEJ and therefore also for imports. 
One of -~he special characteristics of cereal marketing in the Uni tcd 
Kingdo~ is that about 90"/o of the total harvest is stored on the farms. 
Almost all cereal-groi..J'ing holdi;ngs are equipped with a silo and are also 
obliged to have a drying plant because the moisture content in the crop is 
often more than 18% or 20%. ~1e State encourages the creation and 
improvement of storage instco.llations. These installations are of Hidely 
varying types, ranging from impermeable grain silos i..J'hich contain barley 
with a moisture content of 18% that is scaled off from air ru1d is intended 
for farm animals to sophisticated installations ecruipped with delivery 
pits, conveyers, weighing machines, continuous dryers,etc. The cereals 
are stored on the fcrm and sold regularly from September to June. Thus 
the prod'.lcer takes over part of the taa.lcs ~~hich, in the other member 
countries, are generally taken care of by the wholesale trade. The trader 
concentrates on transport of the cereals to the storehouse of the mill or 
of the feedingstuffs factory, but he himself is often the manufacturer or 
distributor of feedingstuffs and sells seed, nwmure, herbicides and 
pesticides t-1hile at the same time advising on these matters. At present 
there is a very strong concentration of activities within the sector. 
This has been achieved to a very high degree in the feedingstuffs and 
milling industries. 
16 4. Intensification of malting bar.ley and malt exports? 
~~-~~~~-~~~~~~---~-~~~~-~~ 
It muct be mentioned here that the climatic conditions in the United 
Kingdom are favourable to the production of ma.lting barley. There is 
therefore every likolihood. that it Hill consolidate its position as an 
exporter ofmalting barley and rnalt in the future. At the moment it is 
exporting to fellow EEC Member Ste.tes but also to distant non~member 
countries such as Nigeria and Japan. Total British barley production, 
1r1hich accounts for more than half of the cereals output, will probe,bly 
increase in the coming yec:,rs more slm'l'ly than wheat production, although 
there could be an increase in the barley surplus in the long term. 
5. Denmar1;: lar,<;;elv self--sufficient ............... ..-- ... _ ............. _ ... 
Denmark entered the Community as a country which is self-supporting to a 
large extent in respect of cereals. Maize is the only cer~al for which 
there is a clear import requirement, i.e. for the current marketing year 
225 000 metric tons, of which 150 000 metric tons are likely to come from 
non-meQber countries and 75 000 metric tons from fellow Hember States. 
~Vi th Belgium and the Netherlands, Denmark is after all one of the !!lost 
important Community countries as regards output of animal products. Despite 
the fact that the area under cultivation was slightly reduced, the Danish 
cereals harvest sho¥ed a cmall increase thanks to the excellent weather 
conditions which prevailed this year. Denmark, with Germany and France, 
counts as ono of the EEC countries ;;here rye is an important product. 
Examination of the statistics reveals that in 1974 in Denmark barley alone 
e.ccounted for 1.5 million hectares of the estimated 1.8 million hectares 
under cer,3als. This is all the more notevrorthy in view of th0 fact that 
this figure refers to summer barley only, since the cultivation of winter 
barley is forbidden in Denmark because of the prevalence of mildew. That 
is why in Denmark there is no question of moving from summer barley to \vinter 
barley in order to reduce production costs, as is already done in ~ance, 
Germany and Belgium. In Dennark vi tal importance is attached to quality in 
the case of barley. This is evidenced by the fact that each year it 
covers more than two-t~irds of its seed requirements with certified seed. 
17 In the opinion of Danish producers, the premiums paid up to now for the 
v~rietally pure malting barleys offer no incentive for accepting smaller 
yields or a~tra costs for sorting and separating the individual varieties. 
Accordingly, further developments could depenCI. on the breeding of neH vari-
eties ;v:i.th top yields and good nalting properties. In the present marketing 
year it should be possible to export about 150 000 metric tons of Danish 
barley to non-menber countries and about 275 000 tons to other Community 
Member States. 
VI. Orgnnizatipn of c~reals market stabilize~~r~ces 
1. ~e2U!i!y_o! ~£PlY 
The US Department of "\griculture estimates the world cereals harvest for 
1974/75 at 916 million metric tons as against a record harvest of 970.2 
million metric tons the previous year. Owing to this smaller harvest, ~he 
world market price level is at present considerably nbove thn.t of the 
Community. It is not possible to say how long this situ£",tion v..l].ll last. In 
the USA, a series of measures are being taken in order to boost home produc--
tion. Since the shortage concen1s'fodder grain in particular, the CorJmission 
must be prepared to accept the fact that maize imports, which in 1973/74 uere 
approximately 13 million metric tons, cannot amount to I:lore tho..n 8.8 metric 
tons in the present marketing year, particularly since the USA wishes, by way 
of voluntar,y control I:leasures, to arrive at a frdr distribution of the scnrce 
supplies among those concerned. The resulting gap, which c~~ be filled only 
by home-grown cereals, wheat in particular, requires, besides a sparing use 
of cereals in the fodder sector, a careful export policy on the part of the 
Conmunity focused on those countries vdth the greatest supply shortages. The 
Comrnn1ity buyer has to reckon with the high world market level only for 
imported goods, whereas for Comounity production the much lower Community 
level prevails. This security of supply as a result of market organization 
has also been aokno;vledged by the Conmu.ni ty's Economic and Social Committee 
in its "Balv..nce sheet of the common agricultural policy", since it goes hru1d 
in hand with price stabilization. 
2. Record Co~uunity harvest brings relief 
-------------------The fact that the Comnuni ty cereals harvest reached nel~ record 
heights in 1974 1vas fortunate in vie1'~ of the swing to scarcity 
on the market. The latest estimated figures issued by the 
Statistical O~fice of the EUropean Communities show that the 
total cereals harvest is 108 million metric tons as compared 
with ~1 million metric tons in 1967. 'Ihe increase can be 
attributed almost exclusively to a rise in the yield per hectare 
of all types of cereal in all Member States. 
18 The nvero.ce yield of \vheat per hectc-.re, for i;;.stc...'Ylce, ~f-l eBtinc.tecl ut 
r.s quintuls for 197-~- c.gainst 33.2 q:uintalc in 1967. Improved cdtimrt±on 
tech.niquec, c.nd ever-i:·lCreacing "'..lse of more productive cereal vnrieties, 
should I'esult in n. fuxther rise in yiolds per hectc.re in the cor:Jing 3rears. 
Regionnl top yields show that the limits hc..ve not yet been rec:.checl; in 
those top :yields, however, quantitative improvement did not ahmys keep 
p~ce with qualitative requireDents. 
H11cn thiE report -vw.s being written, the Commission l·rorked out the CO!:ununity 
cereals balo.ncc for the 1974/75 marketinc year, which e;ave the following 
results for the r:1ost iwportn.nt typeo of cereals: 
i. 
-iCommol1 
lvheat 
•--;_ar_l_e_y-~;_-·,:ra-i-ze ~Durum~­
~rhen.t l--·--------. .. .. I 
Area. under cultivation 
(~illions of ha) 
Yield (quinto.ls per ha) 
Production (rJillions of metdc tons) 
Conswapt ion on the fiU'>.l 
~Tansiticnal stocks 
r:arket sales 
Avnilable qu~tities 
Domestic consumption 
Of which: for fodder purposes 
Carry-over e.t end of roo.rket ing yeo.r 
Dor.1estic requireii1Emts 
Surplus (+) Deficit ( .. ) 
Importc 
9·5 
43.3 
41.0 
7·5 
5·7 
33.5 
39.2 
31.7 
9.0 
4.3 
36.0 
+ 3.2 
+ 3.8 
~--··-----~-------+---
Exports 
1~:1~-~-:~·--------------·~--·-------·-------~·.. == = --·=== 
---+--~ ~~~ 
8.8 
39·3 
31l.4 
15.4 
1.4 
19.0 
20.4 
19.0 
11.2 
1.3 
20.3 
+ 0.1 
+ 1.5 
---
3.0 
48.0 
12.8 
20.1 
15.3 
2.5 
22.6 
- 9.8 
+ 8.8 
_.,_._., ..... .._.__...._ 
1.3 
20.3 
3.6 
0.6 
o.6 
L)..1 
0.7 
+ 1.2 
19 Adli1ittecUy, it must be said thnt c difference of O)inion exists in sor:1e 
l~er.1ber Staten, cs is evidenced by t~1e :f~ct th:.:.t they ntill inuist· o'~ o. 
mize inport of 10.9 millio:1 nGtric tons. There is o,l::;o r.. tliffere;1ce 
of opinion in re{7'.rd to the use of ceroc.lL for fodfl.er po.rposes. 
---r- 1Ull;~-o-~-:~::;~-t:;;--~-· -~ ·-~-· -~- l 
..,_ ___________ .. ______ _ 
Common when.t 
BD..rley 
Haize 
1-----~--------......---! Total 
I Nember States Cor.mlissio~1 
l 
,!:~ ~--1-~~········--
16.8 t' 15.3 
.........------.................... ._._...-...._ ........... -..--................................ .-... ....---. 
34.2 3 5·5 
